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We review Stanley Lieberson's book, Making It Count:

The Improvement of

Social Research and Theory (University of California Press, 1985).

This is an

important, stimulating, and provocative book that should be required reading in
sociological methods and theory courses.

It deserves attention because it is a

reasoned critique of the logic underlying contemporary social research by a
sociologist who has been engaged in research for many years.

Lieberson's

arguments cut to the heart of what sociology is and should be, calling for a
different approach to the study of social phenomena.
The book deals with the objectives of social research and focuses
attention on the current disjuncture between research and theory.

In essence,

Lieberson argues that social research should more often be designed for the
purpose of providing evidence relevant to theory and that moving in this
direction will require changes in research practices.

In this essay we review

and elaborate on Lieberson's major points.
Burton Singer is an Affiliated Faculty member of the Economic Growth
Center. This paper will appear in C. Clagg (ed.) Sociological Methodology,
1987, San Francisco: Jossey-Bass. The research was supported by grants
from the National Institute of Child Health and Human Development, R01-HD19226,
and the National Institute on Aging, K04-AG00296 and R01-AG05715.
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1.

Introduction
Stanley Lieberson's book, Making It Count:

The Improvement of Social

Research and Theory (University of California Press, 1985), is an important,
stimulating, and provocative book that should be required reading in socio
logical methods and theory courses.

It deserves attention because it is a

reasoned critique of the logic underlying contemporary social research by a
sociologist who has been engaged in research for many years.

Lieberson's

arguments cut to the heart of what sociology is and should be, calling for a
different approach to the study of social phenomena.

It is a mistake to view

this book as a narrow critique of the application of quantitative methods
(Costner, 1986; Berk, 1986).

It deals with the objectives of social research

and focuses attention on the current disjuncture between research and theory.
In essence, Lieberson argues that social research should more often be
designed for the purpose of providing evidence relevant to theory and that
moving in this direction will require changes in research practices.

In this

essay we review and elaborate on Lieberson's major points.
The book under review is divided into two parts:

a discussion of current

problems in the development of sociology--roughly three-fourths of the book-
followed by an outline of directions for future research.

In Section 2 we

review and comment on Lieberson's principal criticisms of contemporary social
research.

Section 3 contains a review of the research agenda proposed in the

book; however, we also elaborate on and extend Lieberson's discussion beyond
the general points which he raises.

On the basis of the reviews published to

date (Costner, 1986; Berk, 1986), it seems clear that the research hints
provided by Lieberson were not sufficiently detailed to provide clear direc
tions for persons inclined to pursue the various paths outlined in the book.
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Thus we take some liberties and present some explicit examples of necessary
next steps.

We believe that our proposals are very much in the spirit of what

Lieberson intends, but only he can judge the fidelity of our assessment of his
intentions.

The main point is that we hope to clarify where new research

might begin immediately and thus start the process of responding in depth to
Lieberson's call for reform.
2. Current Problems
Lieberson isolates six problem areas which are in serious need of thorough
reconsideration.

These are:

(i)

the controlled experimentation paradigm;

(ii)

the role of control variables;

(iii)

the contamination problem;

(iv)

conceptualizations of causality;

(v)

the pervasive goal of "explaining variance";

(vi)

inadequate attention to and clarity about levels of analysis.

Subsections 2.1-2.6 treat these topics in turn.
2.1

The Controlled Experimentation Paradigm
The methodology of social research is based on a paradigm of controlled

experimentation as developed and practiced in many physical and biological
. it·1es. l
.
specia
science

Controlled randomized experimentation--an essentially

20th century development utilized in only limited precincts of physical and
biological science--is viewed as an ideal method of inquiry.

After a search

ing and thoughtful evaluation of contemporary sociological research, Lieberson
concludes that very little progress of a fundamental nature is being made
within this paradigm and that the strategies leading to the development of a
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defensible knowledge base in sociology need to be set upon a new foundation.
In particular, a foundation is needed that is essentially tuned to the
phenomena under investigation.
Controlled experimentation, in which the investigator sets the conditions
and perturbs the system in order to measure a response, is rarely possible in
sociology and most other social science disciplines.
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Most of the fundamental

determining influences with which any "science of society" must be concerned
are not subject to manipulation.

Even when experimentation is possible, it is

often socially unacceptable for ethical reasons or, if acceptable, cannot
duplicate adequately the events that would occur in a "natural" setting.
Lieberson does not rule out the possibility that experimentation may be
acceptable and desirable in some situations, but he argues that it can be used
only rarely to address social science questions.
Because most social research is nonexperimental, social scientists have
attempted to simulate controlled randomized experimentation through a quasi
experimental approach.

In nonexperimental research, the investigator must

deal with the operation of selective processes that influence outcomes
observed in the conditions under study.

"If there is any feature of social

life about which a high degree of confidence exists, it would be this simple
principle:

social processes are selective processes" (Lieberson, p. 19).

With an investigative paradigm based on controlled experimentation, a natural
analysis strategy for dealing with selectivity in the observational studies in
sociology is to introduce a wide range of "control variables" as, in effect,
surrogates for the actual controlling that occurs in the domain of experimen
tation.

As Lieberson points out, it requires rather yeoman assumptions and/or

unusual phenomena to justify a comparative analysis of an observational study
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as though it represented conclusions (inferences) from an experiment.

The

main point, however, is that the attempt to imitate the experimentation
paradigm is where the trouble lies.

The goal of approximating, in one sense

or another, the natural science experiment should be given up--except for some
exceptional circumstances--and replaced by strategies which deal with selec
tive processes directly.
2.2

The Role of Control Variables
One reason the quasi-experimental approach breaks down is that a typical

research problem involves many complex layers of selectivity, only some of
which may be known and fewer of which may be controlled.

It therefore becomes

practically impossible to address the problem of selectivity with full and
appropriate controls.

Even the control variables that are used may not

operate effectively as controls if they take on different meanings in dif
ferent situations.

This may occur when changes in social context cause a

variable with the same formal properties to vary in its consequences.

Another

problem with the use of control variables is that conclusions rest on the
assumption that relevant variables are free to vary with one another and that
every possible combination of the values of the variables can appear.

In many

circumstances a control variable is inextricably tied to levels of the
independent and dependent variables so that a conclusion about the relation
ship between the independent and dependent variables net of the control
variables is based on assumptions about combinations of variables that in
reality cannot exist.

Holding control variables constant under these circum

stances does not provide an approximation to what is really going on but leads
to "conclusions about the consequences of shifts in different variables that
either will not occur or, if they do occur, will represent such fundamental

s
changes in the society as to make it certain that the observed linkages will
not remain unchanged with these new distributions of the variables" (Lieber
son, p. 212).

2.3

The Contamination Problem
Counterfactual conditional statements, in which conclusions are predi

cated on events that did not happen, are intrinsic to virtually any compara
tive analysis, and the potential that they will lead to unjustified conclu
sions is present in the physical as well as the social sciences.

Moreover,

such statements are not avoided by getting away from the controlled experimen
tation paradigm.
One factor affecting the confidence with which counterfactual conditional
statements can be made in the social sciences is "contamination."

If a

variable acts in a given setting and generates a response there, it is often
the case that the same or a similar response will be generated in other
settings where the variable in question has never acted.

This "contamination

problem" is the result of diffusion of information across settings and human
reactions to it.

Ignoring this process can lead to major errors of inference

about the consequences of interventions or simply gross errors in projections.
It has been suggested that one way to avoid the contamination problem is
to take a "trajectory approach," in which past events in a given setting
rather than events in other settings are used to determine what "would have
been."

The problem with this approach is that it is usually impossible to

establish what would have been with any confidence on the basis of the
trajectory of changes in the dependent variable prior to the change of
interest in the independent variable.

One reason for this is that trend data

and basic knowledge of social processes are sparse.

Future projections based
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on past events have tended to be quite inaccurate.

There is also the problem

that, just as humans in one setting may anticipate and respond to events in
other settings, humans may anticipate and respond to forth6oming events before
they occur.
2.4

Conceptualizations of Causality
Asymmetric causal forces are a common feature of social phenomena.

However, in social research and theory most causal forces are implicitly
assumed to be symmetric, or bidirectional.

Policy research (recommendations)

is often misguided as a result of ignoring this aspect of a phenomenon and
proceeding as though a given causal linkage was reversible.

Lieberson

identifies three different types of irreversible causes in social phenomena:
(1) constant or invariant social forces; (2) a causal sequence that leads to a
fundamental change in the dependent variable so that it will not respond in
the same way to a reversal of the independent variable; and (3) a causal
sequence that leads to changes in other conditions that preclude the dependent
variable from responding to a reversal of the independent variable.

A

substantial research agenda, only partially stated by Lieberson, must be
addressed if asymmetric causality is to be adequately dealt with in social
research.

In particular, there are intrinsic limits to defensible knowledge

that can be acquired on asymmetric causal processes where replication of such
a process is not to be found naturally and where experimentation can basically
not be carried out.
2.5

The Pervasive Goal of "Explaining Variance"
There-is an enormous theory gap which leads much empirical social

research to focus on "variance explained" about a dependent variable(s) in
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terms of crudely plausible independent variables as a primary target in
analyses.

Searching for variation before delineating candidate theories

linked to specific research goals essentially forces the investigator away
from fundamental questions about social processes.

The substantive importance

of variables is judged in terms of their contribution to explained variance,
and variables that do not contribute to the explained variance are often
discarded.

Conclusions derived from this approach tend to be ad hoc, since

the distributions of the independent and dependent variables vary across
settings and data sets.

Thus, accounting for variation within restricted

cla.sses of models is an "end-game" in the research process.

It is not germane

to getting at deep understanding of basic social processes.
One problem with the most popular models in use is that they attach
importance to systematic variance but not to random variance.

If a process is

stochastic, both deterministic and chance factors may operate so that know
ledge of deterministic factors would not be expected to account for all of the
observed variation, even under ideal research conditions.

As Lieberson notes,

this point was made by Spilerman (1971) in an analysis of intercity variation
in race riots during a period of the 1960s, but it has had little impact on
subsequent work in sociology.

In order to determine how much variance should

be explained by measured variables, it is necessary to have a theory so that
the effects of variables can be analyzed within the framework of an appro
priate model.

For a superb series of examples illustrating this point in the

context of historical demography, the reader should consult Wachter (1978).
Another problem with the focus on explained variance is that this goal
has had a major effect on the choice of problems for study within sociology.
In order to explain the variance in a dependent variable, there must be
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variance in both the independent and dependent variables examined.

This need

for variance in variables under study has led researchers to focus on problems
addressable with data sets that contain variation on the variables of interest.

In most instances this variation has been at the individual level,

and the subject of analysis has been interindividual differences in a
dependent variable.

Many, if not most, fundamental sociological questions,

however, cannot be addressed through this type of analysis because the
questions focus on macro-level, structural forces in which there is little or
no variation.
Because the analysis of interindividual differences or variation is not
well-suited to address many questions of importance in sociology, it is of
interest to consider why this approach has become so predominant in social
research.

The answer is that a transfer of methodological knowledge occurred

from genetics, where statistical methods for analyzing variance were original
ly developed (Fisher, 1918; Wright, 1921).

However, in genetics the analysis

of variation was motivated by the major substantive concerns of the field:
"The genetics of a metric character centres round the study of its
variation, for it is in terms of variation that the primary genetic
questions are formulated [emphasis added]. The basic idea in the
study of variation is its partitioning into components attributable
to different causes. The relative magnitude of these components
determines the genetic properties of the population, in particular
the degree of resemblance among relatives." (Falconer, 1961:129)
Lieberson rightly claims that the questions in much social research are not
driving the analysis; instead, the reverse is frequently true.

Thus an often

useful tool now diverts attention away from the more fundamental substantive
issues, many of which are not naturally formulated in terms of variation.
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2.6

Inadequate Attention to and Clarity about Levels of Analysis
Since preoccupation with explaining variance has led researchers to focus

largely on accounting for interindividual differences, and many of the
questions of central importance in sociology concern the functioning of larger
collectivities, there has been a tendency to confuse levels of analysis and
either assume or argue that the analysis of associations at the individual, or
micro, level can inform us about processes operating at a higher level.

This

is not the case since an "association observed at one level need not hold at
another level" (Lieberson, p. 108).

Observations of associations at the micro

level cannot be used to infer that similar associations exist at a macro
level, just as observations of associations at a macro level do not indicate
that similar associations will be found at the micro level.
The importance of distinguishing between processes operating at the micro
and macro levels and of understanding the dynamic interconnections between
these levels has been an issue raised in two recent articles on the current
state of sociology (Coleman, 1986; Collins, 1986).

Lieberson argues for

greater attention to macro-level processes in social research, cautioning that
the associations among variables at the micro level which now receive consid
erable attention usually do not provide information about "basic causes."

3.

New Approaches and a Research Agenda
With Lieberson 1 s criticism at hand, we discuss some necessary responses.

Many of the specific suggestions in subsections 3.1-3.5 could be readily
implemented and would, in our opinion, shift much social research in a more
meaningful direction.
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3.1

Research Goals. Doable Problems. and Uncertainty Principles
Lieberson laments the fact that much social research is carried out

without clearly delineating the goals of the investigations.

In particular,

descriptive studies, which in our view comprise most sociological research,
are not sharply distinguished from theory testing, and these two types of
studies in turn are often not treated as distinct from evaluations of policy
interventions.

The goals of description, theory testing, and policy-targeted

program evaluations are associated with quite different working environments,
and a failure to take account of the environmental constraints can lead to
unnecessary attempts at what we would regard as intrinsically undoable
problems.
Most descriptive analysis and theory testing operates within the competi
tive environment of the academic social science community, and the pace of
advance of knowledge is largely set by the activity level of research workers.
Policy analysis, if it is to be useful, must also be timely, and the nature of
the information and the time scale for its delivery is largely set--in the
United States--by the pace of the legislative process and the information
requirements of political actors (Coleman, 1978; Cordray, 1986).

Fundamental

theoretical developments and long-term empirical studies cannot ordinarily be
carried out if information delivery is to be synchronous with the needs of the
Congress in developing new legislation--e.g. bills on welfare reform or
housing subsidies--or, for that matter, judges in need of refined evidence for
particular litigation.
One among many examples of this situation were the income maintenance
experiments authorized by congress to guide welfare legislation and carried
out in the late 1960 1 s and 1970's (Ferber and Hirsch, 1982).

The experiments
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were of long duration and had major components in descriptive analysis, theory
testing, and even theory development.

The time required for these activities

virtually guaranteed that the results of these experiments would be produced
quite out of synchrony with the legislative process for welfare reform.

For

more details on this point as it relates to income maintenance experiments,
housing allowance experiments, and time-of-use electricity pricing experi
ments, see Fienberg, Singer, and Tanur (1985).

See also Cordray (1986) and

references therein for further elaboration of the timetable and structural
features of policy research which is responsive to congressional information
requirements.
Even in traditional descriptive analyses, one may encounter undoable
problems.

For reasons not entirely clear to us, there seems to be an implicit

view in much of social science that any question which might be asked about a
society is at least answerable in principle.

The uncertainty principles which

intrinsically restrict the class of answerable questions in physical science
settings somehow do not seem to have clearly enunciated analogues in social
science.

We regard this as a major knowledge gap and a research item--i.e.,

the delineation of broad classes of uncertainty principles--of major import
ance.

There is already a nice start in this direction (Cohen, 1986), and we

illustrate the issues with a simple example.
Suppose you are interested in comparing an individual's survival chances
in two different countries.

An obvious strategy is to seek a single pair of

comparison groups that share as many~ possible of that individual's charac
teristics.

The goal of "as many as possible" runs into an uncertainty

principle that limits the evidence that can be mounted to address the question
of individual survival chances.

In particular, the maximum number C of
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characteristics that can be used to specify two comparison groups and the
minimum differenced in probabilities of death that can be detected in given
populations are constrained by inequalities--i.e., an uncertainty principle-
of the form

where N is the population mean of two countries of comparable size, and p 1 and
p are constants where o<p 1 <1 and p >0.
2
2
tails.)

(See Cohen, 1986:35 for more de

The important feature of this inequality is that as the number of

characteristics C increases so must the minimum detectable differenced,
thereby demonstrating a tradeoff between refinement of population definition
and precision of measurement.

Matching on
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as many as possible" of the

characteristics, even if they exist in a data set at hand, can lead to the
impossibility of detecting a difference at the level of precision attainable.
Limiting the number of characteristics on which comparison groups are matched
to account for the resolution of current measuring techniques is what is
needed.
3.2

Theory Development and Testing
Lieberson argues that more social research should be directed to the goal

of developing social theory.

A primary requirement for this development to

occur is the construction of formalized theories.

Richer theories leading to

the use of fewer control variables and setting up apriori relationships among
variables would go a long way toward eliminating excessively complex use of
control variables and thus freeing much social research from the controlled
experimentation paradigm.

Where appropriate, such theories should specify the

influence of both deterministic and chance elements, indicating how exact a
theory is expected to be in explaining a given outcome.

The conditions under
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which the theory pertains should also be precisely specified and increasingly
refined through a process of elaboration and testing.

Carefully formulated

theories are important because they provide the basis for development of a
cumulative body of knowledge.

Since there is now relatively little formalized

theory in sociology, going beyond description is a major innovative exercise.
Thus, although a wide response to Lieberson's directive concerning the
developmerit of theory is of central importance to the advancement of sociolo
gy, it will not be easy to bring about.
"Theories and/or data that create strong counterfactuals or disprove
counterfactuals that we think are strong are major advances to knowledge.

An

important function of theory is to suggest, or actually provide, new counter
factuals or to disprove old counterfactuals 11 (Lieberson, p. 229).

It is

important in a wide variety of specific problems (research domains) to develop
a body of maximally plausible counterfactuals upon which one can build and
expand into other counterfactuals.
With this plea for major theoretical developments, we looked for a social
science example that would suggest meaningful starting strategies in what is
surely a monumental task.

In our opinion a nice point of departure, well

worth careful examination, is the development and empirical evaluation of the
Heckscher-Olin-Vanik (HOV) model of international trade by Leamer (1984).
This study begins with a new development of the HOV model as a theory of
international comparative advantage and provides a rigorous derivation--from
the theory--of a set of linear estimating equations.

Leamer then develops a

carefully articulated level of aggregation of traded goods across industries
and presents data from 58 countries on 10 commodity aggregates and 11 produc
tive factors in the years 1958 and 1975.

He establishes relationships between
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resource endowments and trade in what is, in our opinion, an exquisite
collision between an economic theory and empirical data analysis.

In addition

to providing a role model for theory development and testing, Leamer even
concludes the book with a chapter on counterfactual experiments that will
surely repay careful study.

Again, this international trade investigation is
stimulate theory development of the type

only a beginning, but one which may
Lieberson is recommending.
3.3

Clarifying What is Meant by Causality
The word
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causal 11 has come to be used loosely in sociology and therefore

has no precise meaning as a scientific term.

Rather than continue to use this

term as if it has meaning, we need to rethink what we mean by causality--both
conceptually and operationally--and to clarify the circumstances under which
we will agree that X 11 caused 11 Y.
several forms of determination.

As a concept, causation is only one of
Other forms of determination include quanti

tative self-determination, interaction, mechanical determination, statistical
determination, structural determination, teleological determination, and
dialectical determination (Bunge, 1979:17-19).

All forms of determination

involve "constant and unique connection" among objects or events, but causa
tion has the additional property of
change by external factors.

11

productivity"--i. e., the production of

Therefore, many relations in sociology which are

now termed "causal" are not causal but involve other forms of determination.
It should be recognized both that causality is not the only form of determina
tion and that other forms of determination play an important role in scienti
fic laws.
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Lieberson is never precise about what he would regard as adequate
evidence to say that X 11 causes 11 Y.

A coarse but useful start at a formulation

is presented by Mosteller and Tukey (1977:260-61):
"Two or three sorts of ideas usually are required to support the
notion of 'cause':
1.

Consistency.
~that when other things are equal in the population we
examine, the relation between x and y is consistent
across populations in direction--perhaps even in amount.

2.

Responsiveness.
~that if we can intervene and change x for some indivi
duals, their y's will respond accordingly.

3.

A mechanism.
~that there is a mechanism which someone might sometime
understand, through which the 'cause' is related, often
step by step, with the 'effect'--the sort of mechanism
where, at each step, it would be natural to say 'this
causes that 1 • 11

Only Point 1 can be confirmed by observation.

Point 2 requires experi

ments including "natural experiments," and these tend to be rare in sociology.
Point 3 awaits both the theory development and empirical testing discussed in
the previous subsection.
For most social research these standards are currently--and are likely to
remain for the foreseeable future--quite out of reach.

Thus one is led to

either dropping the terminology of "causal relation" or considering weaker,
but nevertheless very useful, notions of it.

In this regard the evolving

notions of causality in epidemiology, starting with the Henle-Koch postulates
--see the superb review articles by Evans (1976, 1978)--and proceeding to
present day criteria involving immunological and molecular genetic evidence,
are very instructive.

Indeed the evolving--with technological advance and
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field discovery--criteria for causality where a given organisro(s) is said to
give rise to a given disease (or chain of diseases) in the epidemiological
literature would be a useful starting point for thinking precisely about what
one should mean by

11

causality11 for social processes.

In this connection Evans

(1978:255) has already set forth a 1:1 correspondence between rules of
evidence in criminal law and contemporary operational criteria for establish
ing causality in epidemiology.
Since virtually all statements about causality are assertions about the
behavior of a social process over time, it is imperative that both theoretical
formulations and empirical analyses focus on dynamical processes.

From the

perspective of data collection, this means that longitudinal data should be
the standard form of empirical evidence utilized for studying social proces
ses.

The yeoman assuroptions--alroost always untested and untestable--which

accompany much of contemporary cross-sectional research should be disregarded,
and a new longitudinal research agenda substituted in its place.

Of par

ticular importance is the fact that any hope of distinguishing between
asymmetric and symmetric causality lies in the direct study of social proces
ses evolving over time.
stage.

This, in turn, puts longitudinal data on center

However, it should be noted that longitudinal data in themselves are

not sufficient to establish a causal relation.

As noted by Bunge (1979:39),

"the cause is existentially prior to the effect--but need not precede it in
tiroe. 11

Even longitudinal data roust be used with care when making inferences

about causality.
As a final point it should be emphasized that the rethinking of causality
being advocated here focuses on the phenomena under investigation and their
measurement.

Thus it stands in contrast to model-based notions of causality--
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sometimes referred to as "causal modelling"--which dominate the contemporary
social science literature.

Ideally one would like to link these approaches;

however, such a discussion would also require, in our opinion, incorporation
of the various concepts of degrees of determination articulated by Bunge
(1979).

For an excellent review of model-based notions of causality, as

contrasted with Bunge's discussion, the reader should consult Geweke (1986).
Also, an instructive, earlier article is Hurwicz (1962).
3.4

Selectivity
Most contemporary social research that takes account of selection

processes refers to this phenomenon with the negative connotations, "selection
problem" or "the problem of selection bias."

This vocabulary is a consequence

of the fact that:
(i)

Most program evaluation is carried out in a setting where a primary
goal is extrapolation of conclusions about the effectiveness of an
intervention to a target population that includes people who never
self-select to be program participants (Heckman and Robb, 1986).
In this situation strategies for bias adjustment become of para
mount importance;

(ii)

There is a pervasive emphasis on national surveys or, more general
ly, large heterogeneous population studies in which a major aim is
generalizability of behavioral comparisons made on subpopulations
whose existence is partially or entirely the result of a selection
process to broader target populations.

The aim of generalizability

automatically forces consideration of a selection "problem."
The technology of selection bias adjustment is still in a relatively
formative stage (Wainer, 1986), and this fact suggests that intensive develop-
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ment of the statistical methodology of such adjustments should dominate the
research agenda on selectivity in the immediate future.

In our opinion, a

more productive activity would first involve a shift of philosophy in which
selection processes as such are viewed as primary foci of investigations.
Developing dynamical models of voluntary participation in manpower training
programs, family planning programs, migrant farming, health insurance plans,
and a diverse array of other activities would stimulate the production of
refined theories of selection as a social phenomenon.

For a nice example of

this kind of investigation in the context of both legal and illegal immigra
tion from Mexico tq the United States, the reader should consult Massey
(1985).

This study deserves careful scrutiny for its sensitive mix of

anthropological field methods with conventional survey techniques to get at a
deeper understanding of voluntary participation in illegal Mexican-U.S. border
crossing with an eye toward improved economic position for Mexican families.
In our opinion, Massey's Mexican study is a good role model for a response to
Lieberson 1 s plea for closer examination of selection processes.
3.5

Knowledge Synthesis
The vast proliferation of studies of educational interventions, the

impact of school desegregation on performance of blacks on achievement tests,
the influence of various health insurance plans on health care utilization in
elderly populations--to name only a few topics--has created a need for
rational strategies for combining evidence from multiple sources to summarize
current states of knowledge.

This topic has a long history in the physical

sciences--see, e.g., Cohen, Crowe, and Dumond (1957)--and has rather recently
made a somewhat controversial appearance in the social sciences under the
guise of meta analysis (Hedges and Olkin, 1986).

In our opinion, this topic
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will be of increasing importance both for the development of new sociological
theories and, most especially, in the policy arena where the production of
timely knowledge syntheses is of critical importance.

The U.S. General

Accounting Office has, from its inception, been a knowledge synthesizing
organization for the U.S. Congress.

Here, the ever increasing demand for

rapid and defensible syntheses of evidence on such diverse topics as housing
subsidies and their impact on low income populations, quality control and its
impact on the cost of military aircraft, and the economics of alternative
energy resources has led to an important and innovative development of meta
analytic strategies (Cordray, 1986).

In our opinion, further efforts in this

direction should be of high priority because of the need for knowledge
synthesis in theory development and policy planning.
4.

Conclusions
Making it Count is an important and provocative book whose contents

deserve to be discussed and debated on a wide scale.

The message is that,

without a thorough redirection of research efforts, little progress will be
made on fundamental conceptual and methodological issues in sociology.
challenge is great, but so are the potential rewards.

The

It is our hope that

Lieberson 1 s critique of current practices will be given a serious and thought
ful hearing and that some of the research topics that we have spelled out in
the previous section will be taken up as a much needed response to Making it
Count.

20
FOOTNOTES

1.

It is a somewhat subtle matter to be precise about what one means by the
word "experiment. 11

See, for example, Campbell (1957), Bunge (1979),

Feinstein (1985).
2.

Although Lieberson speaks in terms of the social sciences generally, his
focus is essentially on sociology (including social demography).

Our

review therefore focuses on this discipline, although many of our
comments pertain to economics, social psychology, and epidemiology.
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